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Abstract 
 
In this paper we develop a model in which students choose their university coursework 
based on both investment and consumption incentives. We show that these education 
decisions are socially inefficient. This result is driven by the fact that students do not 
consider an externality in the working environment of acquiring education for 
investment purposes. We show when and how it is possible to design tuition fees in 
such a way that students acquire the socially optimal level of education. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the literature on the economics of education, the theory of human capital assumes that 
investments in education increase a worker's productivity (Becker, 1993). The classic theory of 
human capital does not consider that consumption incentives may also influence educational 
choices.  Various evidence suggests consumption incentives in educational choices are important.  
University curricula vary widely in the job prospects after graduation. Students are often 
observed choosing majors and courses with weak job opportunities. This is not for lack of 
information.  A student has a multitude of information about job opportunities in each field of 
study.  For example, it is widely acknowledged that the job opportunities associated with pursuing 
an engineering degree are more favorable compared to those from an art degree.  Interpreting 
education as a consumption good can help explain attendance at university courses that have weaker 
job prospects.  A student may, for example, find taking an art course more enjoyable than an 
engineering course.  
There is a relationship between income and the education acquired by an individual. This 
relationship refers both to the amount of education acquired and to the choice of curricula.  In both 
cases, interpreting education as a consumption good may explain this relationship.  First, 
educational attainment increases with income (Becker, 1967, 1993, McMahon, 1976, 1984, and 
1991, Acemoglu and Pischke, 2001, Blanden and Machin, 2004, Vona, 2011, inter alia). The 
economic literature offers three explanations for this: financial constraints; pre-existing ability 
differences correlated with parental income (e.g., due to non-cognitive skills acquired from the 
environment in which a student is raised); and differences in risk aversion (Ellwood and Kane 2000, 
Cameron and Heckman 2001, Carneiro and Heckman 2002). The empirical evidence is also 
consistent with the alternative interpretation that education may be considered as a normal  
consumption good rather than a pure investment good. 
Second, there is a relationship between the choice of coursework and the student's household 
income. Parents with lower income levels are more likely to encourage their child to choose 
university courses that are associated with more promising job prospects, regardless of the child's 
preferences. Given this parental pressure, a poor student is more likely to choose coursework that 
can increase her opportunities in the job market. There is some evidence supporting this statement. 
Baird (1967), in a study based on a comparative socioeconomic analysis of 18,378 prospective 
college students, found that students from higher income homes were relatively more concerned 
with developing their intellect, while students from less affluent households were more concerned 
with vocational and professional training. The Baird (1967)'s results are confirmed by Dealney 
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(1998), who provides evidence that lower income students are more concerned about how college 
will prepare them for a career. Trusty et al. (2000), using the NELS:88 data set, examined choice of 
major field of study at postsecondary institution when students were 2 years beyond high school. 
They found that, at the highest level of socio-economic status, increases in academic performance 
resulted in a decrease in the choice of enterprising-related majors.  Leppel et al. (2001) examine the 
data from the 1990 survey of Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) that follows a group of 
students who began their postsecondary educational careers during the academic year 1989-90. 
They show that an increase in socio-economic status of the families of college students would be 
good news for humanities and social science departments, but bad news for education, science and 
engineering departments.4 Leppel et al. (2005) exploit the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
in order to examine processes by which students enter lucrative fields of study, selective colleges, 
and lucrative fields within selective colleges. They show that students from families with high 
socio-economic status have a much greater probability of selecting lower income fields.  
Interpreting education as a consumption good may explain this evidence: poor students are more 
likely to choose education with stronger investment characteristics than are rich students. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis of educational choices having education 
explicitly modeled as a consumption or investment good. The analysis can provide input to help 
design an efficient educational policy.  A question that may arise is why university courses that are 
associated with weaker job prospects should be subsidized. Similarly, should tuition fees be the 
same for university courses that differentially affect a student's future earnings? The aim of this 
paper is to address such questions. 
We develop a model in which a student acquires education both with consumption and 
investment features.  Educational investment increases a student’s future earnings and has a positive 
effect on the general productivity of the working environment (Benabou, 1996).  Thus, investment 
in education is associated with a positive externality.  Other educational expenditure has only a 
consumption value.  When a student chooses its levels of consumption and investment education, 
the investment externality is not taken into account.  As a consequence, in the private equilibrium, a 
student acquires too little educational investment, compared to the social optimum. 
The paper considers next possible government interventions to engender the social optimum, 
specifically (i) regulated tuition fees or (ii) regulated levels of education.  We show that with 
enough information it is possible to either manipulate tuition fees or set minimal levels of education 
to induce students to acquire the socially optimal levels of education.  In the case with regulated 
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tuition fees, this result emerges if tuition fees for education consumption are kept at the marginal 
production cost of providing education, whereas the tuition fees for education investment are set 
below marginal production cost.  Assuming student ability is private information, we show when 
these schemes are incentive compatible.   
This paper can also provide a theoretical explanation for some findings in the empirical 
literature on heterogeneous human capital and heterogeneity in the returns of education. In this 
literature, Antonji et al. (2012) and Yamaguchi (2012) provide some recent contributions and new 
evidence, while Sanders and Taber (2012) offer a review of the literature.   
This paper offers theoretical support to policies stimulating STEM (science, technology. 
engineering and mathematics) education. An example of such a policy is the 2007 “America 
Competes Act” (P.L. 110-69), which responds to concerns that the United States may not be able to 
compete economically with other nations in the future due to insufficient investment today in 
workforce development.  The policy is intended to increase the nation's investment in STEM 
education from kindergarten to graduate school and beyond to postdoctoral education. The act 
authorizes funding increases for the National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) laboratories, and the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of 
Science. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
shows the difference between the private equilibrium and the social optimum. Section 4 considers 
possible government interventions, in particular either (i) the design of optimal tuition fees or (ii) 
the introduction of minimum (optimal) levels of education investment.  Section 5 concludes.  Proofs 
are provided in the appendix. 
 
2. The model 
 
Students differ continuously in ability θ  and household income 0Y . The joint distribution on 
student type ( )0,Yθ  is continuous and given by ( )0,YF θ , with joint density function ( )0,Yf θ , 
assumed to be positive on its support    ×   00, 0,Yθ . 
There are two periods.  In period 0, students attend college. In period 1, they work and earn 
an income. When students attend college, they decide the amount and type of education they want 
to acquire. The unique feature of this model is that education can be acquired for two different 
reasons: (i) for investment reasons, i.e., education can be acquired to increase future income; and 
(ii) for consumption reasons. Regarding the latter, an individual may be interested in a specific 
topic, may want to become more knowledgeable for social interactions in trendy topics, and/or may 
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want to acquire social status given by obtaining a college degree though such coursework will not 
increase future income.   
In college, different courses of study present different proportions of these two elements of 
education. This is due to different labor demands for alternative expertise (engineers may be more 
in demand than art experts), and to alternative interest from a social point of view toward topics 
(e.g., being conversant about arts, cinema, philosophy, and literature may be considered more 
interesting than being able to do advanced mathematics).  The relative consumption vs. investment 
value of topics may change over time.  In the future, people may find more socially intriguing a 
mathematician than an artist, and the labor market may need more philosophers than engineers.  
Our analysis does not refer to specific courses.  Instead, we denote the amount of education 
acquired for consumption as 1e , with per unit tuition fee 01 >t ; and the amount of education 
acquired for investment as 2e , with per unit tuition fee 02 >t .  We do not put constraints on the 
amount of education needed to acquire a degree.  Even though a degree requires usually a specific 
amount of courses, a student may attend only one year, or keep studying at a master’s program, or 
attend a short term course, or a summer school. 
Provision of higher education is perfectly competitive.  Colleges set their tuition fees in such 
a way as to cover their marginal resource cost, ii ct = , where ic  is the constant marginal resource 
cost of providing teaching for every course type { }2,1∈i .  
Students have a utility function over numeraire consumption in the present 0c , education 
consumption 1e , and future numeraire consumption y: 
( ) ( ) ( )−= + + >11 0U ln e ln c k ln y , , ,k 0;β βα θ γ α γ        (1) 
where ( )ββθ −1
1
ln e  denotes the benefit obtained by consuming education, assumed increasing with a 
student's ability.5  Future consumption is given by: 
( ) ( )−= + + >
11
2y e E s 1 r , 1;
σ
σσθ σ          (2) 
where ( ) σσσθ
11
2 Ee
−
 is income, savings ℜ∈s  (borrowing if negative) is determined in period 0, and 
r  is the interest rate.  E measures productivity of the workforce and is given by:6 
( ) ( ) ., 10012 −− 





= ∫∫
σ
σ
σ
σ
θθθ dYdYfeE          (3) 
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 Our main results do not depend on the assumption that higher ability students get more value from consuming 
education.  We have in mind that brighter students generally learn more in their tertiary studies.   
6
 All integration in what follows is over the support of household types. 
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The specification follows Benabou (1996).7  Future earnings are Cobb-Douglas in own human 
capital ( 2eθ ) and an index of all worker’s human capital (E), with constant returns to scale.  The 
index of all workers’ human capital is increasing in any workers’ human capital with a constant 
elasticity of substitution (σ) between any two worker’s human capital.  In this specification, σ > 1 is 
needed for human capital to have a positive marginal product.  Our central results do not require 
these functional forms, but the specification is appealing and easy to work with.    
In equilibrium, students maximize their own utility by choosing their initial consumption, 
savings, educational consumption, and educational investment, subject to the budget constraint 
( ) ( ) ′ ′′= + + + + + > =0 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 i iY c t e t e e e s, , 0, i 1,2;ψ ψ ψ ψ      (4) 
where ( )ii eψ  is the time cost of education for each course type { }2,1∈i . 
 
3. Private vs social optimum 
 
In this section we develop the baseline results of the paper.  We compare the private equilibrium 
with socially optimal allocations.  For every student type ( )0,Yθ , the private problem is: 
− + +
0 1 2
1
1 0
c ,s ,e ,e ,y
Max ln( e ) ln( c ) k ln( y )
s.t. ( 2 ) and ( 4 );
β βα θ γ
                                                                                         (5) 
 
taking as given E.8  Solving the individual’s problem (see the appendix), one obtains: 
        
Proposition 1.  For every student ( )0,Yθ , the individually optimal levels of education chosen in 
equilibrium are Pe1  satisfying: 
 
( ) ( ),'1 111
1
0 et
e
c ψβα
γ
+=
−
          (6) 
 
and Pe2  satisfying: 
 
( ) ( ).'1
1
222
111
2 et
r
Ee ψθ
σ
σ σσ
σ
σ
+=
+
−
−
−
         (7) 
 
 Condition (6) equates the marginal consumption benefit of e1 (LHS) to the marginal cost 
(RHS), the latter consisting of the tuition and time costs.  Condition (7) equates the discounted 
marginal increase in future income from educational investment (LHS) to the marginal cost.  
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 See equations (5) and (6) in Benabou (1996). 
8
 Consistent with the atomism of individuals in the economy, an individual’s own choice of e2 will not affect his own 
earnings by affecting E.   
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Straightforward manipulation of the first-order conditions to the individual’s problem (see the 
appendix) shows that P1e is increasing in household income.  This is, of course, because the utility 
specification implies that consumption goods are normal.  Observe, however, that (7) implies 
educational investment is independent of income.  Under our assumption of perfect capital markets 
(i.e., s is unconstrained), the educational investment decision reduces to maximization of the present 
value of lifetime income, the solution depending on ability but not endowed income.  With perfect 
capital markets, the correlation between household income and educational expenditure is explained 
by educational consumption.   Using ′′ >2 0ψ and σ > 1, one can confirm using (7) that P2e is 
increasing in own ability and the economy human capital index, these results reflecting 
complementarity in the workplace. 
We turn now to the social problem and characterize first-best Pareto efficient allocations. 
Let ( ) 0, 0 >Yθω  denote the weight on student ( )0,Yθ ’s utility in the social welfare function, and let 
( )0 0 0T ,Y [T( ,Y )]θ θ  denote the planner's monetary transfer to household ( )0,Yθ  in period 0 [1] and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫∫ ∫∫0 0 0 0 0 0T ,Y f ,Y d dY [ T ,Y f ,Y d dY ]θ θ θ θ θ θ  the corresponding total transfers. In the 
social welfare problem, the government budget must be balanced: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
+ + +
=
+
∫∫ ∫∫ ∫∫
∫∫
1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
c e f ,Y d dY c e f ,Y d dY T ,Y f ,Y d dY
1 T ,Y f ,Y d dY 0
1 r
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ
     (8) 
The social planner dictates period-0 consumption ( )00 ,Yc θ , savings ( )0,Ys θ , the levels of 
educational consumption and investment ( )01 ,Ye θ  and ( )02 ,Ye θ , and chooses balanced-budget 
transfers ( )00 ,YT θ  and ( )0,YT θ  so as to maximize the social welfare function: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )−
=
 + + + ∫∫
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0
1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
W c ( ,Y ),s( ,Y ),e ( ,Y ),e ( ,Y ),T ( ,Y ),T( ,Y )
,Y ln e ( ,Y ) ln c ( ,Y ) k ln y T ,Y f ,Y d dY ;β β
θ θ θ θ θ θ
ω θ α θ θ γ θ θ θ θ
            (9) 
where y is implied by the distasted savings and the production constraint.   Suppressing the type 
dependence, the social planner's problem is: 
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( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
−
−
−




= + + ∀


  =    
= + + + − ∀
+ +
+ =
+
∫∫
∫∫ ∫∫
∫∫ ∫∫
0 1 2 0
0 1 2 0
c ,e ,e ,s ,y ,T ,T ,E
11
2 0
1 1
2 0 0
0 0 1 1 2 2 0 0
1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
W c ,s,e ,e ,T ,T
s.t. y e E s 1 r ( ,Y )
E e f ,Y d dY
Y c e e s T ( ,Y )
c e f ,Y d dY c e f ,Y d dY
1T f ,Y d dY Tf ,Y d dY 0
1 r
max
σ
σσ
σ
σ σ
σ
θ θ
θ θ θ
ψ ψ θ
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ







                                                    (10) 
 
The first two constraints in (10) are the technological constraints determining future incomes.  The 
third constraint is the household balanced budget condition that individual “choices” must satisfy.  
The last constraint is, again, the planner’s balanced budget condition.   We have written the problem 
having the planner pay for the cost of education.  Since the planner can do lump-sum income 
transfers, the latter is with no loss of generality.9  A solution of the problem is Pareto efficient for 
any social welfare weights ( )0,Yθω .  If a Pareto improvement were feasible relative to any solution, 
then the objective function would increase with the change, so that a contradiction would emerge. 
As the social weights vary, alternative Pareto efficient allocations are determined, since as one 
moves along the Paretian frontier the slope changes, which equal the social welfare weights 
corresponding to the particular Pareto efficient allocation. If the utility possibilities set is convex, 
then all Pareto efficient allocations are a solution to the maximization problem for some set of 
weights.10 
 Solving the problem (see the appendix) we obtain: 
 
Proposition 2. For every ( )0,Yθ  student, the socially optimal levels of education in equilibrium are 
W
1 0e ( ,Y )θ  such that: 
 
( ) ( )− = +0 1 1 1
1
1c
c ' e ,
e
α β ψ
γ
                                     (11) 
and W2 0e ( ,Y )θ  such that: 
 
                                               
9
 Allowing the planner to just do lump-sum income transfers in one of the periods does not restrict the solution since the 
planner can dictate savings.  We write the problem allowing both, and then verify the latter (see the appendix).  
Similarly, the planner could have households pay for their dictated educational levels and then offset these with 
transfers.  We had to choose one way to write the problem!  
10
 If the utilities possibilities set is not convex, then one can still find all Pareto efficient allocations as extrema of the 
planner problem (Panzar and Willig, 1976). 
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( ) ( )
−
−
= +
+
1 1 1
2
2 2 2
e E
c ' e .
1 r
σ
σ σ σθ ψ           (12) 
 
 Comparing (6) and (11), using that t1 = c1 in competitive equilibrium, one sees that the 
private and social optimum coincide if the level of first-period consumption is the same in each 
solution.11  No externality arises in private choice of educational consumption.  In contrast, 
comparing the LHS of (12) to the LHS of (7) with t2 = c2, one sees the difference in the social 
marginal benefit and private marginal benefit equals ( )
−
−
>
+
1 1 1
2e E 0,
1 r
σ
σ σ σθ
σ
 if the marginal benefits are 
evaluated at the same values of e2 and E.  Using that ′′ >2 0ψ and that e is increasing in the 
2 0e ( ,Y )θ values, it is easy to show: 
Proposition 3. For educational consumption, the private and social optimum coincide. For 
educational investment, the private optimum has lower 2e  than in any  social optimum. 
 
Underinvestment in education in the private equilibrium is due to the human capital 
externality in production.  Individuals do not reap the full social benefit of their educational 
investment, while bearing the full cost.  In the next section we examine intervention that would 
provide socially optimal incentives. 
Finally, notice that social-welfare weights on student types ( )0,Yθω  do not play any role in 
determining the socially optimal levels of 2e . Similarly to in the private solution, optimal levels of 
e2 simply maximize lifetime income, but in the aggregate in the social solution. 
 
4. Government intervention 
 
4.1. The design of optimal tuition fees 
 
In this section, the planner sets and collects tuition fees, while paying for actual cost of education, 
and individuals make their privately optimal choices.  The main result is:  
Proposition 4.  Regulated tuitions: 
 
−
= = −
+
1 1
w w
2 0
1 0 1 2 0 2
e ( ,Y ) ( E )
m ( ,Y ) c and m ( ,Y ) c ,( 1 r )
σ
σ σθ θθ θ
σ
                                                            (13) 
with appropriately adjusted lump-sum income transfers (see the appendix) induce private choices 
that replicate any Pareto Optimum.   
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 Because the economy will be more productive in the social welfare solution and the planner may have preference for 
redistribution, we would not expect c0 to be the same in the two solutions.  However, given the desired transfers and 
socially efficient choices of e2, letting households choose e1 would be efficient.  This is shown below.   
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 Formal proof is in the appendix, but Proposition 4 is very intuitive.  Tuition for educational 
investment is subsidized relative to marginal production cost by the amount of the marginal 
externality.  The optimal tuition subsidy must vary by type, in particular by ability.  This issue is 
further discussed below.    
4.2 Regulated levels of education 
 
In this section, we assume that the government imposes regulated levels of education, without 
altering tuition fees from the competitive ones. In particular, we consider the case in which the 
government sets a minimum level of education investment that students need to acquire.  That is, 
the planner requires Mee 22 ≥ , where the superscript M stands for “minimum”. The main result here 
is:   
Proposition 5. A minimum required level of education investment =M W2 2 0e e ( ,Y ),θ combined with 
appropriately adjusted lump-sum income transfers (see the appendix) induces private choices that 
replicate any Pareto Optimum.   
4.3 Discussion 
 
Several issues related to informational constraints warrant discussion.  Our analysis has assumed 
educational investment is observed in the labor market.  If students could complete coursework 
without effectively developing their skills, then our results are called into question.  It is then 
important that education providers enforce standards.  College exit exams, as are becoming 
increasingly popular, provide a means to support learning and teaching incentives.  College 
reputation can also assist in this regard.  In the discussion that follows, we continue to assume skills 
are observed or conveyed accurately when students enter the labor market.   
 A key finding of our analysis is that efficient educational investment varies with student 
ability.  Thus the interventions examined above require that ability can be observed or discerned.   
If students know their ability but it is private information, they would not generally have an 
incentive to reveal truthfully their ability when confronted with the above interventions.  In the case 
of tuition subsidies, they would want to maximize the subsidy.  In the case of a minimum 
educational investment, they would want the minimum to correspond to their preferred investment.  
Neither intervention is consistent with truthful reporting.  Suppose, though, that “good” tests exist 
that can be used to determine ability prior to pursuing higher education.  If a student takes the test 
seriously, then their ability is well measured.  More precisely, students can perform to the level of 
their ability if they try, cannot perform beyond their ability, but could underperform if they choose.  
The issue is then whether the above interventions are consistent with students not underperforming 
on college entry exams.  To consider this, we assume that any transfers are independent of student 
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ability (i.e., social welfare weights in the social objective function do not depend on ability).  Then 
we have: 
Proposition 6.  If pre-college tests exist that allow students to perform only up to their ability (or to 
underperform), then the regulated tuition scheme induces accurate ability signaling while the 
minimum educational investment scheme does not.        
 The proof (see the appendix) follows this intuition.  Confronted with an educational 
investment minimum that exceeds their preferred investment (Propositions 3 and 5) with truthful 
ability revelation, students prefer a lower minimum.  Because the efficient minimum decreases with 
actual ability (see the Proof of Proposition 6), students prefer to underperform on an entry exam.  In 
contrast, the efficient subsidy to educational investment increases with student ability (as shown in 
the Proof).  Of course, students are better off the higher is the subsidy to educational investment, 
providing them with efficient incentive to perform on an entry.  It is notable that the incentive to 
perform as well as one can on an entry test under the tuition subsidy scheme applies as well if 
students are unsure about their ability.    That is, if the tuition subsidy scheme is based on measured 
ability with an accurate test (conditional on students doing their best), then the efficiency and 
incentive compatibility findings continue to apply if students do not know their own abilities.  The 
results here obviously are supportive of using the tuition subsidy approach rather than investment 
minima. 
 A separate issue regarding investment minima is whether graduation requirements provide a 
substitute.  A simple total credit requirement is not a perfect substitute for the educational 
investment minimum approach for two reasons.  First, educational consumption should not count 
toward the graduation requirement, though students should be able to take such courses as they 
please for private efficiency.  Obviously, though, a graduation requirement could include 
completion of minimum coursework in investment areas and universities typically require 
completion of a subset of particular courses or a subset of courses from a restricted set.   The second 
problem with common graduation requirements interpreted thought the lens of our model is that 
efficient investment varies with ability.  Higher ability students should have to satisfy more 
stringent graduation standards.  While issues related to different fields of study are not an element 
of our model, variable major requirements may be consistent with the notion of requiring more of 
higher ability students.  The course requirements to major in engineering or mathematics are 
frequently relatively “heavy” and regarded as more difficult.  Of course, elements our model cannot 
address are likely to explain the structure of major and graduation requirements.  The requirement 
to take a set of math courses to major in engineering can be simply explained by the need to know 
the math to solve engineering problems.  On the informational side, an interesting topic is whether 
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graduation requirements and variation in them can be explained by second-best efficiency.   For 
example, suppose that ability is private information and that institutional rules prevent varying 
tuition by type of study.  Might minimal graduation requirements provide a second-best solution 
where the set of students that select into college are induced to increase educational investment 
toward efficient levels?  Might variation in major requirements facilitate more refined selection and 
further enhance efficient investments?  Future research might investigate these questions. 
5. Summary and concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have analyzed a simple model in which students choose their university 
coursework with both investment and consumption incentives.  The intent of the analysis is to 
clarify how these incentives determine choices and how private choices allocations.  Assuming 
education is priced at marginal cost, students would underinvest in education due to a human capital 
externality in the workplace. Subsidizing tuition for educational investment could correct the 
externality as could minimum educational investment requirements.  Since the efficient tuition 
subsidy or investment minimum varies with student ability, these interventions are not simple and 
require the policy maker to observe or infer student ability.  Tuition subsidies correct incentives to 
underperform on exams used to measure ability, while this incentive compatibility would fail with 
the use of educational investment minima.  It is of interest to investigate higher education policies 
like graduation requirements in light of imperfect information.  Although the paper's aim to 
investigate consumption versus investment incentives is somewhat limited in scope, we hope the 
results provide useful input to the design of higher education policies. 
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6. Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1:  To solve the problem stated in (5), substitute (2) into the objective function 
and write the Lagrangian function: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )[ ].
1lnlnln
22112211001
11
20
1
1
seeetetcY
rsEekceLP
+++++−
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The first-order conditions with respect to seec ,,, 210  and 1λ  are: 
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Substitute (A.5) into (A.4): 
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k 1 r t ' eke E1 0 or,simplifying :
e E s 1 r e E s 1 r
σ
σ σ σ
σ σ
σ σσ σ
ψθσ
σ θ θ
    
   
( ) ( )
−
−
−
= +
+
1 1 1
2
2 2 2
e E1
t ' e ;
1 r
σ
σ σ σθσ ψ
σ
        (A.7) 
 
confirming (7).  Now substitute (A.2) into (A.3) giving:   
 
( ) ( )− = +0 1 1 1
1
1c
t ' e ;
e
α β ψ
γ
         (A.8) 
 
confirming (6) and completing the proof. 
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Proof that e1P is Increasing in Y0:  Eliminate λ1 from (A.2) and (A.5) yielding:  
 
−
+ = + +
1 1
0 2c k(1 r ) s(1 r ) ( e ) E .
σ
σ σγ γ θ    
 
From (A.7) one can see that e2 is independent of Y0.   Differentiating the latter equation with respect 
to Y0 then gives: 
+ = +0
0 0
dc dsk(1 r ) (1 r ) .
dY dY
γ                                                                                                     (A.9) 
Now differentiate the budget constraint (A.6), again using that e2 is independent of Y0: 
′= + + +0 1 11 1
0 0 0 0
dc de de ds1 t .
dY dY dY dY
ψ  
Substitute (A.9) into the latter: 
′= + + +0 11 1
0 0
dc dek1 (1 ) ( t ) .
dY dY
ψ
γ
                                                                                             (A.10) 
Differentiate (A.8) with respect to Y0: 
( )−
′′= +0 11 1 1
0 0
1 dc de( t e ) .
dY dY
α β ψ
γ
 
Combining the last two equations yields: 
 
−
−
′= + + +
′′+
11
1 1
0 1 1 1
de k (1 ) 1[ t (1 ) ] ;
dY t e
α βψ
γ γ ψ
 
 
which is seen to be positive by inspection.   
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  The Lagrangian function for the problem in (10) is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
−
−
 = + + 
  
+ + + +  
   
 
− + + + + + 
 + +

+ ++ 
−
∫∫
∫∫
∫∫ ∫∫
∫∫ ∫∫
W 1
0 1 0 0 0
11
0 2 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 2 2 0
2 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
3
L ,Y ln e ln c f ,Y d dY
,Y k ln e E s 1 r T f ,Y d dY
Y c e e s T
c e f ,Y d dY c e f ,Y d dY
1T f ,Y d dY Tf ,Y d dY
1 r
E e
β β
σ
σσ
ω θ α θ γ θ θ
ω θ θ θ θ
λ ψ ψ
λ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
λ θ( ) ( )− −
 
     
 
∫∫
1 1
2 0 0f ,Y d dY .
σ
σ σ
σ θ θ
    (A.11) 
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We first find the first-order conditions with respect to the type-dependent variables and multipliers 
0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0c ( ,Y ),e ( ,Y ),e ( ,Y ),s( ,Y ),T( ,Y ),T ( ,Y ), and ( ,Y ).θ θ θ θ θ θ λ θ  It is more convenient to 
compute the first variations of the Langrangian with respect to the density weighted values; e.g., 
with respect to 0 0 0c ( ,Y ) f ( ,Y )θ θ  rather than 0 0c ( ,Y ).θ   With some abuse of notation, we write 
these variations as ∂
∂
L
.
x
  We have: 
 
( )∂
= − =
∂
W
0 1
0 0
,YL 0,( c f ) c f
ω θ γ λ
        (A.12) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )−∂ = − + =∂
W
0 1
1 1 2 1
1 1
,Y 1L
' e c 0,( e f ) e f
ω θ α β λ ψ λ      (A.13) 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
−
−
−
−
−
∂
=
∂
−
− + − =
+ + +
W
2
1 1 1
1 1 1
2 1
0 2 2 2 2 3 211
2 0
L
( e f )
ke E1
,Y ' e c E e 0,f
e E s 1 r T ,Y
σ
σσ σ σ
σ σ σ
σ
σσ
θ λσ
ω θ ψ λ λ θ
σ θ θ
 (A.14) 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )−
+∂
= − =
∂
+ + +
W
0 1
11
2 0
,Y k 1 rL 0,( sf ) f
e E s 1 r T ,Y
σ
σσ
ω θ λ
θ θ
      (A.15) 
    
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )−
∂
= + =
∂ +
+ + +
W
0 2
11
2 0
,Y kL 0,(Tf ) 1 r
e E s 1 r T ,Y
σ
σσ
ω θ λ
θ θ
     (A.16) 
 
∂
= + =
∂
W
1
2
0
L 0,(T f ) f
λ λ                                (A.17) 
 
and 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )∂ = − + + + + =∂
W
0 0 1 1 2 2 0 0
1
L Y c e e s T ,Y 0.ψ ψ θλ       (A.18) 
 
The first-order conditions for the non-type dependent variable and multipliers are: 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ,0,
,1
, 300
0
11
2
11
2
0 =+






















+++
=
∂
∂
∫∫
−
−
−
λθθ
θθσ
θθω
σσ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
dYdYf
YTrsEe
EekY
E
LW
                 (A.19) 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
∂
= + +
∂
+ =
+
∫∫ ∫∫
∫∫ ∫∫
W
1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
L
c e f ,Y d dY c e f ,Y d dY
1T ,Y f ,Y d dY T ,Y f ,Y d dY 0,
1 r
θ θ θ θλ
θ θ θ θ θ θ
    (A.20)  
 
and 
 
( ) ( ) .0, 100
1
2
3
=





−=
∂
∂ −−
∫∫
σ
σ
σ
σ
θθθλ dYdYfeE
LW
      (A.21) 
 
Begin by noting that (A.12) implies: 
 
( )
=
0
1
0
,Y
;
c
ω θ γλ           (A.22) 
 
(A.17) gives: 
 
= −
1
2 ;f
λ λ            (A.23) 
 
and, finally, (A.16) implies: 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
.
,1
,
1
0
11
2
02
YTrsEe
kY
r θθ
θωλ
σσ
σ
+++
=
+
−
−
       (A.24) 
 
Substitute (A.24) into (A.19), yielding: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
−
−
− + =
+∫∫
11
22
0 0 3
e E f ,Y d dY 0.
1 r
σσ
σσθλ θ θ λ
σ
      (A.25) 
 
Using ( ) ( ) 10012 , −− 





= ∫∫
σ
σ
σ
σ
θθθ dYdYfeE  from (A.21), rewrite (A.25) as:  
( ) ,01 3
11
2
=+
+
−
−−
λ
σ
λ σ
σ
σ
σ
EE
r
  
( ) .1
1
2
3
r+
=⇒
σλ
λ
          (A.26) 
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Consider now (A.14).  Substituting (A.24) into (A.14) gives: 
 
( ) ( )
− −
− −
−
− − + − =
+
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1
2 2 2 2 2 3 2
1
e E ' e c e E 0.
1 r f
σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ
λ λσ θ ψ λ λ θ
σ
    (A.27) 
 
Substituting (A.23) into (A.27), divide through by λ2, and use (A.26) to get: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
− −
− −
−
− − + =
+ +
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2
2 2 2
e E e E1
' e c 0
1 r 1 r
σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σθ θσ ψ
σ σ
   
 ( ) ( )
−
−
⇒ = +
+
1 1 1
2
2 2 2
e E
c ' e .
1 r
σ
σ σ σθ ψ        (A.28) 
 
Thus, we have confirmed (12).  Consider now (A.13). Substituting (A.23) into (A.13) yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )− = +0 1 1 1
1 1
,Y 1
' e c .
e / f
ω θ α β ψλ         (A.29) 
 
Plugging (A.12) into (A.29) to get: 
 
( ) ( )− = +0 1 1 1
1
1c
c ' e .
e
α β ψ
γ
         (A.30) 
This confirms (11) and completes the proof.   
 
Degree of Freedom in Choice of T(θ,Y0) and T0(θ,Y0):  We noted in footnote 6 that the planner need 
not do lump-sum transfers in both periods 0 and 1 to optimize.  To see this from the solution to the 
optimization problem, note that the condition on the transfer in period 0 is (A.17).  Note further that 
(A.17) is implied by conditions (A.15) and (A.16), i.e., the conditions on saving and the future 
transfer.  This means that (A.17) can be satisfied for any period-0 transfer, including 0 transfer, so 
long as saving and the period-1 transfer are adjusted to satisfy (A.15) and (A.16).  Similarly, one 
can argue that transfers could be 0 in period 1 while maintaining the optimum. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  We must show that the private solution with regulated tuitions as in (13) 
and appropriately adjusted lump-sum income transfers replicates any solution to the social problem.  
Let 0T( ,Y )θ and 0 0T ( ,Y )θ denote the transfers in the social solution that will be replicated.  (These 
transfers depend on the social welfare weights, which are suppressed.)  Adjust the transfers in the 
regulated-tuition problem to be: 
= + +
=
* w w
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 2 0
*
0 0
T ( ,Y ) T ( ,Y ) m e ( ,Y ) m ( ,Y )e ( ,Y )
T ( ,Y ) T( ,Y );
θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
                                                          (A.31) 
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where, recall, the w-superscript indicates the optimal educational values in the social solution.  We 
suppress the type-arguments in the discussion that follows.   
 Replace t2 with m2 in the condition of the private problem for choice of e2 [(6) or (A.7)], 
implying immediately that = w2 2e e is implied by the social optimal condition [(12) or (A.28)].  
Comparing (6) and (11) [or (A.8) and (A.30)], using that m1 = c1 = t1, we see the private choice of 
e1 is the same as the socially efficient choice provided c0 in the solution to the regulated-tuition 
problem is the same as in the social problem’s solution.  Using that future income in the regulated-
tuition (private) problem now adds T* = T to future income, (A.2) and (A.5) imply: 
−
+
=
+ + +
1
0
2
k( 1 r )
.
c ( e ) E s( 1 r ) T
σ
σ
γ
θ
                                                                                                (A.32) 
Using (A.12) and (A.15) from the solution to the social problem, one obtains the same condition.  
Similarly, using the period-0 transfer in the regulated-tuition problem in (A.31), it is implied that 
the individual budget constraints (see (A.18)) are the same in both problems.  Thus, the conditions 
determining the vector 0 1( c ,s,e )are the same in each problem implying the same values. 
 Last, note that the government budget is balanced in the regulated-tuition problem, since, 
using (A.31) and that the government collects m1 and m2 for education choices from individuals, 
condition (A.20) is replicated.  This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5:  Keeping in mind that the solution to the social problem had the planner pay 
directly for education costs, while the problem with minimum investment has individuals pay the 
competitive costs, the lump-sum transfers (indicated with superscript **) are adjusted to maintain 
the incomes of households:  
= + +
=
** w w
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 0
**
0 0
T ( ,Y ) T ( ,Y ) c e ( ,Y ) c e ( ,Y )
T ( ,Y ) T( ,Y ).
θ θ θ θ
θ θ
 
 
The government budget remains balanced since the planner no longer pays for education.  Given 
individuals will in fact choose the minimum investment, along the lines of the Proof of Proposition 
4 all other private choices replicate the social optimum.  Since the marginal time cost of investing in 
education is increasing, the investment choice will in fact be at the minimum. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6:  First we reject the investment minimum scheme as inducing accurate ability 
signaling.  We have shown that w P2 2e e>  for all types, so a student’s incentive is to reduce their 
required education investment relative to w2e .  Differentiating (12) one obtains: 
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1 1 1
w 2
2
1 1 1
2 2
1
e E /( 1 r )
e 0,
1
e E /( 1 r )
σ σ σ
σ σ
σ σ σ
σ θ
σ
θ ψ θ
σ
− −
+ −
−
−
+∂
= >
∂
′′ + +
                                                                                     (A.33) 
where the inequality uses that 1.σ >   Thus, any student would prefer to signal lower than their 
actual ability to reduce their required educational investment.   
Now consider the scheme with tuition regulation.  A student is better off facing a lower 
regulated tuition.  From (13), the regulated tuition declines with ability if and only if 
1 1
w
2( e )
σ
σ σθ
−
−
is 
increasing in θ.  Using (A.33) and differentiating, one obtains after straightforward manipulation: 
1 1 1
1 1
1 1w 2
2
2 1 1 1
2 2
1
e E /(1 r )(( e ) ) 1( e ) 1 0;
1
e E /( 1 r )
σ σ
σ σ σ σ
σ σ
σ σ
σ σ
σ σ σ
θθ σ σθ
θ σ ψ θ
σ
− +
−
−
−
− −
− +
−
 
+ ∂ −
= ⋅ − > ∂  ′′ + +
  
                (A.34) 
the inequality using that the ratio in the bracketed term is less than 1.  Thus, signaling as high an 
ability as feasible (i.e.,, actual ability) is the student’s preferred strategy.   
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